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This paper reports on a study that compares the views of corporate CEOs and
public pension funds on two corporate governance issues: chairman - CEO duality and
election of a board lead director. Questionnaires were distributed to public pensions funds,
each with assets of at least one billion dollars, and to corporations selected from the
Standard and Poor’s 500 and Standard and Poor’s midcap 400 indexes. The results
indicated that CEOs did not favor either splitting the CEO and chairman positions or the
election of a lead director. Pension funds also did not favor splitting the two positions but





Historically, from the beginnings of American corporate finance, investors have
sought influence within the corporations they financed. A well known and early example
of investor influence is the case of General Motors. In 1920, a series of strategic and
financial blunders sent General Motors’ stock price tumbling. Its largest shareholder,
Pierre S. Du Pont, assumed GM’s presidency himself. After three years in the role, he
handed control of the company to Alfred P. Sloan (Taylor 1990).
As corporations grew, one owner or a small group of owners could rarely satisfy
their capital needs. Coupled with the emergence of professional managers and the
dispersion of stock holdings across millions of individual investors, investors became less
involved in the operations of the companies they invested in. In 1933, Adolf A. Berle and
Gardiner C. Means noted that the legal owners (shareholders) had become divorced from
the control of the corporations they invested in. Professional managers had assumed the
traditional roles of ownership. The authors concluded that most owners own stock,
insurance savings, and the like and did not manage; on the other hand, most managers did
not own stock in their companies (Berle & Means 1932).
One Harvard Business School study begun in the 1940s raised questions that are
still unresolved today:
Repeatedly, we were cautioned that the board — and when executives and
directors use this term they invariably mean the outside members of the board
— should not be involved in what was termed ‘day-to-day’ management of the
business, and that it should not have a disruptive interference with
management. Yet whenever we tried to pin down what the speaker meant by
this, the response would be something like ‘Well, it’s very difficult to be
specific’ or ‘It’s hard to say, it varies from company to company.’ Thus, very
early on we were faced with an apparent conundrum… How is it possible to
have an active, effective and participating board that does not have a disruptive
interference with management? (Lynch 1979).
A variation on this same question faces pension plan sponsors today — how is it
possible to be active, effective, and participating long-term investors without disruptively
interfering with management or corporate directors?
BACKGROUND
Peter Drucker, as well as others, has noted that pension funds, particularly public
pension funds (pensions sponsored by government for the benefit of public sector
employees), have unique characteristics differentiating them from other institutional
investors. Because they are created as an act of public policy, and represent the public
sector, they have closer ties to government than most corporate stakeholders. Insul ted
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from pressures of fund investors seeking short-term performance, the public funds can
actuarially predict their cash flow needs decades in advance, thus enabling them to take a
long-term view. Additionally, the $100 billion asset size of some of the larger public funds
makes their security holdings somewhat more illiquid than many other institutions.
(Drucker, 1992).
In recent decades, as the size of their equity holdings has grown, many institutional
investors have sought to assume more active roles in the governance of the corporations in
which they have invested. Finding it difficult to follow “the Wall Street Rule” (which held
that if investors were dissatisfied with a company’s performance or practices they should
sell the stock), public pension funds have tended to adopt a more active mode of share
ownership. Resisting more confrontational methods, pension funds have sought to
influence companies through negotiation and public statements. A fund can apply pressure
to a CEO by identifying a company as structurally flawed or underperforming. Reflecting
their strength, the funds find that many companies will work with them to resolve issues
rather than risk public confrontation.
SPLITTING THE CEO AND CHAIRMAN POSITIONS
The separation of ownership from management and the continued growth of the
capital needs of companies spawned an evolutionary change in the role of the chief
executive. An increase in the size and complexity of business gave rise to the need for an
increasingly sophisticated and professional manager. In short, as companies matured, their
capital needs led to changes in the relationship between owners and managers. Levy notes
that these changes began to be reflected through the title generally granted to a chief
executive:
Until the period between the two World Wars, today’s largest corporations
typically had neither a chairman nor a chief executive officer, but one person
whose only title was that of president. Between 1910-1935, the title of chief
executive officer was probably first granted to establish the president’s
increasing power in a period when that was crucial to organizational growth.
Many presidents fought to establish primacy over their own senior managers.
In addition, presidents often had to r ise outside money to finance growth,
without ceding control to financial suppliers.
Following World War II, the titles of chairman and CEO were frequently
combined in one person, possibly in recognition of the extremely strong
position of the CEO. That remains the dominant practice in the United States
today in large, public companies. What it now means to be chief executive,
while still somewhat unsettled, is much clearer that what it means to be
chairman, and the title of CEO connotes considerable power, while that of
chairman does not (Levy 1993).
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Only a small minority of corporations in the United States have installed an outside
director as chairman, but the practice has long been common in Great Britain. According
to Proned, a London research organization, 80 percent of U.S. public companies combine
the jobs, a practice referred to as CEO duality. In Britain the reverse situation is the norm,
as only 24 percent of public companies have a combined chairman and chief executive
(Stevenson 1992).
Even in the 20 percent or so of U.S. firms where the position has been separated,
non-governance reasons usually precipitated the separation. A Conference Board survey
found that about one-quarter of the chairmen represented in the survey were not the CEOs
of their firms, suggesting that the idea of a separate board chairman is not a novelty.
However, this structure usually meant that although a retiring CEO had relinquished that
title to his or her successor, while keeping the chairman title during the transition period
until the actual time of retirement. In addition, activist shareholders of a few troubled firms
pressured the incumbent CEO to relinquish that role and accept a new, diminished one as
chairman only. The Conference Board report deemed these cases to be unusual (Bacon
1993).
The case for splitting the CEO and chairman positions was made by Lorsch and
MacIver who argued that, when the positions were combined, the CEO exercised great
power primarily because of his or her expertise in and knowledge of company matters. In
addition, since the CEO determines what information directors receive, in most cases they
see the company through the CEO’s eyes. Also, the CEO controls the agenda and plays an
important role in the selection of outside directors. All of these factors impede outside
directors from fully exercising their power. Furthermore, since many outside directors are
themselves CEOs, they are reluctant to criticize a fellow CEO. Consequently, directors’
concerns about problems may not be communicated to one another until the problems
have become so great that they threaten the survival of the company. Accordingly, Lorsch
and MacIver support splitting the position of chairman and CEO. They contend that
providing a leader separate from the CEO could help directors prevent a crisis and act
quickly when one does arise; would give directors a strong voice in setting meeting
agendas and in selecting directors; encourage more open discussions in meetings; and
would underscore the board’s right and obligation to govern the corporation (Lorsch &
MacIver 1989).
Support for splitting the two positions has also come from various pension funds.
For example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (Calpers) proposed
naming an independent chairman for the Electronic Data Systems Corporation, arguing
that oversight of management was hindered by the fact that the board’s chairman also
served as the company’s chief executive officer (Cropper 1998).
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Opposition to the proposal for the chairman and CEO split comes primarily from
corporate executives. For example, in its statement of opposition to a proxy proposal to
split the position at Sears the company wrote, “The sponsors of the proposal do not
indicate why an outside director must be chairman in order to share his or her particular
advice and counsel” (Corrigan 1992).
Additionally, surveys conducted by the consulting firms Korn/Ferry and William
M. Mercer show that U.S. CEOs who do not also hold the position of chairman receive
lower compensation than those in a dual role (Fr zee 1997; Levy 1993). It would seem
logical that CEOs are unlikely to favor structural changes in the executive office that
would decrease their earnings.
Compensation expert Pearl Meyer adds that the proposal would require extensive
redefinition of the chairman’s duties. She contends that “At many companies, the
chairman’s role is not just to run board meetings -- it’s a functioning executive position,
but an outside director serving as chairman would lack the knowledge about company
operations to perform executive duties. Also, an outside chairman might come in highly
disgruntled with the CEO’s leadership, causing excessive bickering and infighting over
control of the company leading to poorer performance” (Corrigan 1992).
Research conducted by Gideon Chitayat on Israeli companies that split the
positions provides support to the opponents of a split in the chairman and CEO positions.
Chitayat found that the division of labor between a chairman and the CEO varied from
company to company and depended on their personalities. Nevertheless, the chairmen of
the board seemed to be relatively inactive while the CEOs assumed all of the
responsibilities and power necessary to manage the business. Furthermore, the majority of
chairmen did not believe that their role was to serve as a check on the power of CEOs, but
rather to provide them with advice and ideas. The actual role of a chairman of the board
who was not also the CEO was limited in scope (Chitayat 1985).
Drawing on the information presented above, we formulated the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Public pension plans will be more in favor of splitting the
CEO/chairman position than will CEOs.
ELECTION OF A LEAD DIRECTOR
Perhaps a less radical proposal to deal with CEO duality is electing a “lead
director” in cases where the CEO and chairman positions continue to be held by one
person. As described by Lorsch, the board would elect a lead director who would assume
responsibility for setting the agenda of board meetings, and overseeing the work of board
committees (Lorsch 1995).
Election of a Lead Director
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Arguing for the lead director concept, William G. Bowen (board member of a half-
dozen large enterprises) wrote:
There is much to be said for having an authorized place within the
organizational structure to which directors can go to register concerns and
check impressions, especially when an organization seems to be in trouble or
missing opportunities. The alternatives are not good ones: suppressed
concerns, sub rosa grumbling, or the formation of informal cabals outside the
regular channels. As I can attest from painful experience, the unstructured,
informal approach can entail high costs. In addition to irritating people and
encouraging splits in a board, it also operates slowly and is dependent on the
more or less accidental emergence of a director prepared to take the lead.
Counting on some spontaneously generated process to solve major problems is
not sensible (Bowen 1994).
Earlier, John Smale, retired chairman of the Procter and Gamble company, and
subsequently chairman of the General Motors Corporation, proposed that, “Outside board
members should choose a lead director from their own ranks. This would help directors
overcome a certain amount of inertia [to take action]” (Martin 1993).
General Motors’ board is one of the few that have directly addressed the issue as a
matter of policy. It passed and issued a 28-point document entitled, “Guidance On
Significant Corporate Governance Issues,” which stated that it was the policy of the board
to select a director who would chair regularly scheduled meetings of outside directors; this
director would take on other responsibilities which the outside directors as a whole might
designate from time to time (General Motors Report 1994).
An opposing view to the election of a lead director was offered by Ram Charan,
who contended that appointing a lead director can weaken corporate governance by
imposing layers that inhibit direct communication between the CEO and the board and can
lead to divisiveness and power struggles (Charan 1995).
As in the case of the proposal to split the CEO and chairman positions, the
suggestion for the election of a lead director has proven to be a controversial one. While
CEOs may find the election of a lead director more acceptable than being deprived of the
chairman’s title, we theorized that any meaningful erosion of power would be resisted by
the CEOs. Therefore the following hypothesis was formulated:
Hypothesis 2: Public pension plans will be more favorable to the election of a lead
director, in cases of CEO duality, than CEOs.




Two questionnaires were developed to ascertain the attitudes of two groups:
public pension plans and CEOs of corporations. The questions in both instruments were
identical except for minor wording differences to customize the survey for each group.
The questions were of two types: a set using a five-point Likert scale ranging from
“strongly agree”(5) to “strongly disagree”(1); and two open-ended questions.
The pension plan survey was then pilot tested on 10 pension plans to identify
possible ambiguities and weaknesses in the questions. The survey was subsequently
revised based on respondents’ comments and suggestions.
Sample
The sample consisted of two groups: public pension fund sponsors and chief
executive officers of corporations. The former were the sponsors of all 118 public pension
funds with assets exceeding one billion dollars that were listed in the McGraw Hill
“Money Market Directory” (Money Market Directory 1995). “Sponsor” is the term used
to designate the entity with ultimate administrative, legal, and fiduciary responsibility for a
pension fund. Sponsors may, or may not, choose to engage advisors to assist them with
investments and/or reporting responsibilities. For the CEO sample, 300 companies were
randomly drawn from an alphabetical listing of 900 firms: the Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
500 index and the S&P Midcap 400. Of the 300 companies selected, 159 (53%) were
drawn from the S&P 500 and 141 (47%) from the Midcap 400.
After two mailings of each of the questionnaires, usable replies were received from
68 of the 118 pension fund sponsors (a 57.6% response rate); these respondents managed
62.2% of all public pension fund assets held by the surveyed firms. Usable surveys were
received from 61 corporations (a 20.3% response rate). Thirty-four of the respondents
(55.7%) were from the S&P 500 and 27 (44.3%) were Midcap 400 companies. In addition
to the 61 usable responses, another 18 wrote that corporate policy prohibited their
participation in survey research.
RESULTS
The suggestion that companies adopt a policy of splitting the CEO and chairman
positions so that they would not be held by the same person was not favored by either the
CEOs or the pension funds. Table 1 shows the mean responses of the CEOs and the public
pension funds (where 1 represented strong disapproval and 5 signified strong approval).
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Table 1. Support for Splitting the CEO/chairman Position
CEOs Pension Funds
Mean 2.42 2.10
Standard Deviation 0.12242 0.11681
To test the hypotheses, we used the nonparametic Wilcoxon test because we could
not assume the two populations were normally distributed. Application of the test to the
responses of the two groups on the issue of CEO duality revealed that there was no
significant difference between them at the .05 level. The analysis is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Wilcoxon Test Results for Splitting the CEO/Chairman Position
Z-Statistic Prob>çZç ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
1.68114 0.0927 2.8347 0.0923
Accordingly, Hypothesis 1, which had predicted that the pension funds would be
more in favor of splitting the CEO and chairman position, was not supported.
While the two groups did not differ significantly in their levels of support for
splitting the two jobs, the data do suggest that the CEOs were somewhat more accepting
of the idea than we had expected from the literature. Answers to open-ended questions
suggested that CEOs might be more receptive. For example, none of the pension funds
mentioned CEO/chairman duality as a major policy issue either in the previous 10 years or
as a likely issue over the next 10 years. On the other hand, two of the CEOs wrote that
separation of the two positions had been the most significant governance policy change
enacted by their corporations in the previous 10 years. A third CEO commented that the
splitting of the CEO/chairman position at General Motors had made the concept a more
acceptable consideration.
Turning next to the proposal to elect a lead director when chairman and CEO
positions were combined, the pension funds were more receptive to the idea than were the
CEOs. The mean responses of the two groups are shown in Table 3 (where 1 represented
strong disapproval and 5 stood for strong approval).
Table 3. Support for Election of a Lead Director
CEOs Pension Funds
Mean 2.31 3.25
Standard Deviation 0.11045 0.10539
Application of the Wilcoxon test showed that the two groups differed significantly
in their responses at the .01 level.  The statistics from the Wilcoxon test are shown in Table
4.
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Table 4. Wilcoxon Test Results for Lead Director
Z-Statistic Prob>çZç ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
-5.65526 <.0001 32.0103 <.0001
Therefore Hypothesis 2, which had predicted that, in cases of CEO duality, CEOs
would be less favorable than pension funds to the election of a lead director, was
supported.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study found that, contrary to our expectation, the public pension funds did
not favor splitting the CEO/chairman position any more strongly than did the CEOs. A
possible explanation for the funds’ reluctance to ending CEO duality is that the 1990s
generally have been a period of rising common stock prices for U.S. corporations. It may
be that, except in cases of extremely poor performance by a corporation, public pension
funds (and other institutional investors) have been unwilling to seek radical changes such
as an end to CEO duality. As long as the chief executive continues to function at an
acceptable level and the values of investors’ assets continue to rise, the funds may be
content to observe the status quo.
Another possible explanation is that, in view of the divergent views which have
been expressed toward CEO duality, the funds may not be convinced that ending the
practice will necessarily improve corporate performance and enhance common stock
values. Since the survey did not ask either the funds or the CEOs why they did or did not
favor splitting the two positions, we can only speculate on the reasons for their choices.
The results did support the second hypothesis that, in cases of CEO duality, the
funds would be more favorably disposed to the election of a lead director than would the
CEOs. It is possible that the funds deemed the lead director concept to be a less radical
approach and one more likely to be implemented than ending CEO duality. They may also
have been influenced by the General Motors’ action to establish a lead director for its
board.
The rejection of both proposals by the CEOs is unsurprising. They would probably
be unlikely to want to voluntarily surrender their power to run the corporation and to
dominate the board of directors and, quite possibly, their ability to influence their own
compensation.
It seems doubtful that pension funds will play a passive role in corporate
governance in the future. For example, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association -
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA - CREF) succeeded in replacing the entire board
of Furr’s/Bishop, Inc., a small company operating a chain of cafeterias, because the
company had been performing poorly (Schultz & Warren 1998). Furthermore, the
activism of  U.S.  institutional  investors  (including  large  public  pension  funds such as
Discussion and Conclusion
9
Calpers) is now spreading to European equity markets, with challenges to corporate
management there (Tagliabue 1998).
 This study was conducted during a strong U.S. economy and with U.S. stock
markets at record levels, yielding high returns to investors. Whether the results of the
study would have been the same under conditions of a weak U.S. economy and falling
stock markets is unknown. If economic conditions had been less favorable, it is possible
that the pension funds would have been more inclined to favor an end to CEO duality and
to favor even more strongly the election of a lead director.
Another question that might be raised is whether the attitudes of public pension
funds are the same as those of other institutional investors, such as private pension funds
or mutual funds. These are areas for further investigation. Also the study data were
derived from a written survey asking a limited number of questions. The results could have
been enhanced by additional open-ended questions and by conducting in-depth interviews
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